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Kirgis: A Wishful Thinker's Rehearing in the Hague Case

A WISHFUL THINKER'S REHEARING IN
THE HAGUE CASE
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.*
On March 2, 1981, the United States Supreme Court denied a
petition for rehearing in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.' Thus it
missed an opportunity to extricate itself from a most unfortunate
morass created not only by the absence of a majority opinion on its
first try, but also by the lack of clear analysis on the part of those
Justices who wrote opinions& This article proceeds as though the Supreme Court had granted the petition for rehearing, and supplies the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions that should have been
generated. The hypothetical majority opinion below reflects the analysis I find most persuasive on the Hague facts. The concurring opinion espouses a plausible position, and the dissent presents the arguments against the positions taken in the other two opinions. I do not
presume to attribute my words to any particular Justices, so the majority opinion is per curiam; the concurring and dissenting opinions
are anonymous. 2
OPINION OF THE "COURT"

Per Curiam.
For the sake of clarity, we briefly restate the facts. Ralph
Hague, a resident and domiciliary of Wisconsin, was employed for
fifteen years immediately preceding his death just across the state
boundary in Minnesota. He owned three automobiles, all insured by
Allstate Insurance Company under a policy issued in Wisconsin. The
policy included $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage for each automobile. It contained a clause that, if valid and if construed as the
* Professor of Law and Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee

University School of Law. B.A., 1957, Yale University; J.D., 1960, University of California at
Berkeley.

1. 450 U.S. 971 (1981). The decision on the merits is reported in 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
2. Purists will note a few other departures from Supreme Court style. In accordance
with normal law review practice, citations have been relegated to footnotes. To avoid confusion, the footnotes are numbered consecutively through the three opinions.
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Minnesota court did, prohibited the "stacking" (aggregation) of the
$15,000 coverages if Mr. Hague were to be injured or killed through
the fault of an uninsured motorist.3 Under Wisconsin law at the time
of the decision below, the "no stacking" clause was valid and enforceable; under Minnesota law it was not.
Mr. Hague died as the result of an accident in Wisconsin. He
was a passenger on a motorcycle operated by his son when they were
hit from behind by a car owned and operated by another Wisconsin
resident. Their intended destination apparently had been Eldrwood
Heights, Wisconsin. 4 Mr. Hague was taken to a hospital in Minnesota, but was dead on arrival. 5 Neither Mr. Hague's son nor the
driver of the other vehicle was insured.
After Mr. Hague's death, his widow moved to Minnesota where
she was appointed personal representative of her deceased husband's
estate. She then brought this action in Minnesota against Allstate,
seeking declaratory relief permitting the stacking of the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverages despite the "no stacking" clause in the
contract. Allstate was doing business in Minnesota, as it was in all
fifty states, so it was subject to the Minnesota court's in personam
jurisdiction.8 There is no indication that Mrs. Hague moved to Minnesota simply to avoid Wisconsin's then-extant rule validating "no
stacking" clauses. She married a Minnesotan and apparently settled
in that state.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied Minnesota law to invalidate the "no stacking" clause, allowing Mrs. Hague to collect
$45,000. Following Minnesota precedent,7 that court applied Professor Robert A. Leflar's choice-influencing considerations to resolve
the choice-of-law issue. The considerations are (1) predictability of
results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3)
simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's
3. Policy issued by Allstate Insurance Co. at 6 (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law
Review), quoted in Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of

Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 18 (1981). Professor Weintraub points out a plausible interpretation of the clause that would not have precluded stacking even under Wisconsin law, id.
at 19-21, but we accept the Minnesota court's interpretation for purposes of determining the
constitutionality of its choice of law.
4.
5.

See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1978).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)

(statement of Mr. Lowenfeld).
6. This point was not disputed by the parties. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981): "There is no dispute in this case as to jurisdiction."

7. The leading Minnesota case is Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408
(1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/4

2

Kirgis: A Wishful Thinker's Rehearing in the Hague Case
19821

A WISHFUL THINKER'S REHEARING

governmental interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law.8
The Minnesota court relied heavily on -the fifth consideration in
reaching its result. 9
The question presented is whether Minnesota could constitutionally proceed as it did. The answer is not easy, in part because of
our own imprecision in prior cases. On reflection, we think clarity of
analysis will be promoted if we distinguish between the due process
and the full faith and credit limits on choice of law, since each reflects different constitutional values that could be applied. In so doing, we accept the distinction made by our brother Stevens on the
first hearing in this case, 10 but we do not apply it as he did.
In the choice-of-law context, the due process clause" has been
thought to reflect notions of fairness to the party resisting application of an unfavorable rule of law. The fairness test has commonly
been formulated in terms of that party's expectations: Could the
party reasonably have expected that the particular body of law (usually forum law) could be applied, or perhaps that some relevant
event would occur in the particular state (usually the forum)?2 All
of our earlier opinions in this case recognize that constitutional considerations of fairness apply to choice of law,' 3 and we now reiterate
that point. Nevertheless, as our judicial jurisdiction decisions demonstrate, the due process clause extends beyond protection against undue personal burdens: It also serves as a check on political and judicial power.' 4 In this respect, it embodies the widely shared belief
that a political entity, acting through one of its governmental
branches, exceeds its legitimate sphere of influence when it tries to
control persons, events or relationships not tied to it by some relevant
occurrence or effect within its territory.
This shared belief does not depend on individual parties' expectations, though it does reflect the expectations of society as a whole.
8.

Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.

REV.

267,

282 (1966).
9.

Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (Minn. 1978).

10. 449 U.S. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. The same idea sometimes has been expressed as avoidance of undue surprise to the
resisting party. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFUCT OF LAWS § 9.2A,
at 505 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that surprise is not exclusive example of fairness test); Martin,
The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction,10 HoFSTRA L. REV. 133, 133-35 (1981).
13.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308, 312-13; id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concur-

ring); id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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It has, at times, been formulated as an aspect of federalism. 15 This
formulation is accurate in the limited sense that there would be no
problem (beyond avoiding undue personal burdens) in noninternational situations if our nation were not carved into political entities
with territorial boundaries. But the fundamental concern with preserving a workable federal system rests with other constitutional provisions, 16 including the commerce,1 7 full faith and credit,18 and privileges and immunities clauses.19 Thus, the shared belief regarding the
due process clause depends not so much on the needs of the federal
system as on the conviction that it is presumptuous for a state, even
more than it would be for an individual, to try to issue commands to
all who might be within hearing distance. This conviction may be
aroused when those commanded (or the events concerned) are in a
foreign country, as in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 0 or in no country at all, and not just when they are under the federal umbrella by
virtue of their presence in a sister state. And, it applies equally, if
not more intensely, when the issue is choice of law rather than personal jurisdiction, since the assertion of authority affects persons'
substantive rights and duties."
We adhere to the view expressed in all of our earlier opinions
that Minnesota did not defeat Allstate's reasonable expectations
when it applied Minnesota law. 2 Nevertheless, we hold that Minnesota overextended its power and thereby violated the due process
clause.
When a state supplies the rule of law to settle a private contro15. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir.), affd mem., 454 U.S. 1071
(1981); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589, 1591-92 (1978).
16. See generally Redish, Due Process, Federalism,and PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112 (1981).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

18.

U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 1.

19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
20. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
21. See Redish, supra note 16, at 1128-29, 1132-33; Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity Lost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 197, 201 (1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The
End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 82-83, 87-88 (1978).
22. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 317-18; id. at 328 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Id. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Reese, supra note 21, at 197-98. It is plausible to argue
that the choice of Minnesota law was unfair to Allstate even though the choice did not defeat
its reasonable expectations, since Allstate derived no benefit from Minnesota in this transaction. See Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law 62
CORNELL L. REV. 94, 103, 106-09 (1976). Nevertheless, we do not base our decision on this
rationale.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/4

4

Kirgis: A Wishful Thinker's Rehearing in the Hague Case
1982]

A WISHFUL THINKER'S REHEARING

versy, it is exercising state power. To do so legitimately, it must have
within its territorial grasp some occurrence or relationship that its
rule is designed to regulate.23 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion on
the first hearing in this case implicitly recognized this by identifying
three "contacts" with Minnesota.24 In the aggregate, these contacts
might be thought to justify its assertion of state power. On reflection,
however, we think they are insufficient for that purpose.
The issue facing the Minnesota court was the validity of a "no
stacking" clause in an insurance contract issued in Wisconsin to a
Wisconsin domiciliary. The accident occurred during an intrastate
excursion in Wisconsin. Although Mrs. Hague's subsequent move to
Minnesota probably gave that state an interest in applying its own
law invalidating the "no stacking" clause,25 it came too late.28 Nothing remained of the contract except the duty to pay. The "no stacking" clause was beyond amendment or rescission by agreement of
the parties to the contract, and it should equally be beyond amendment or rescission by legislative fiat of a state that became interested
only after the duty to pay had accrued. To hold otherwise is simply
to say that the rational desire to exercise power is a reason to legitimate its use.
That leaves two contacts: Allstate was doing business in Minnesota, and Mr. Hague was employed there, at all pertinent times. Our
reconsideration convinces us, however, that these two contacts are
irrelevant for due process purposes.
As some commentators have pointed out, if Allstate's business
in Minnesota is a relevant contact for choice of Minnesota law, it
must also be a relevant contact for choice of the law of all fifty
states. 27 Due process limitations are not so undiscriminating. In ad23. See Kirgis, supra note 22, at 103, 105-06.
24. 449 U.S. at 313-20.
25. See Weinberg, Conflicts Cases and the Problem of Relevant Time: A Response to
the Hague Symposium, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1023, 1028 (1982).

26. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), and Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), both involved a post-occurrence change of residence to the
forum state. In both cases, forum law benefited the new resident; in both cases, the change of
residence was deemed constitutionally irrelevant. Accord Hague, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
27. E.g., Reese, supra note 21, at 198; Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the
Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law ConstraintsAfter Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HoFsTRA

L. REV. 103, 106 (1981); Weintraub, supra note 3, at 29-30. In a distinguishable but

relevant context, we have rejected the notion that the "debt" owed by a nationwide insurance

company to its insured is "present" wherever the company does business, since it would thus
be present in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330
(1980).
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dition, contrary to what was said in the previous plurality opinion, 28
we think it important that even though the New York reinsurers in
the Dick case transacted business in the forum state (Texas), 29 the
due process clause precluded Texas from applying its own law to
invalidate a provision in the reinsured contract.30 In the present case,
as in Dick, the rights and obligations under the contract were created outside the forum state. Further, forum law in both cases was
unfavorable to the petitioning insurance companies. The Texas court
in Dick had jurisdiction-and thus had the opportunity to apply its
own law--only because the reinsurers transacted business in Texas,31
precisely as Minnesota's opportunity in this case depended on Allstate's business in Minnesota. Since we did not treat the reinsurers'
business in Texas as a relevant contact permitting choice of Texas
law,3 2 neither will we treat Allstate's Minnesota business as a relevant contact in the absence of some connection between that Minnesota business and the insurance contract at issue.33
Mr. Hague's employment in Minnesota is also irrelevant. He
was not driving to or from work when the accident happened. Minnesota's public policy-to maximize benefits available to insureds injured or killed by uninsured motorists-is not designed to protect its
work force. This is shown most clearly by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's emphasis on Minnesota's interest in protecting Mrs. Hague
as a post-accident Minnesota resident; the court mentioned Mr.
Hague's employment only to argue that because he commuted to
work, "the risk which was covered by the policy was located in Minnesota as well as Wisconsin."" Moreover, scholarly analysis shows
that the Minnesota stacking rule is not employment-related.3 5 Thus
28. 449 U.S. at 310 n.12.
29. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 15 S.W.2d 1028, 1029 (Tex. 1929).
30. 281 U.S. at 407-08.
31. The garnishment procedure used in Dick would not be permissible today as a means
of obtaining jurisdiction over the original insurer. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
32. 281 U.S. at 408.
33. We realize that the clause at issue here was in an insurance contract issued (in
Wisconsin) by Allstate, whereas the clause at issue in Dick was in an insurance contract issued
(in Mexico) by a Mexican company and not by the reinsurers. The important point is not,
however, whether the party doing business in the forum state issued the insurance contract,
but whether (a) it had any relationship in that state with the insured, or perhaps with the
beneficiary of the insurance, at any relevant time, or (b) the contract itself had any connection
with the forum state.
34. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. 1978).
35. Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems:As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1343-47 (1981); see von Mehren & Trautman, Constitu-
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Mr. Hague's Minnesota employment does not support Minnesota's
attempt to apply its rule invalidating the "no stacking" provision in
the insurance contract.
Since Minnesota's exercise of the power to supply its rule of law
was not based on any relevant occurrence or relationship in Minnesota, it violated the due process clause. This being so, there is no
need to decide whether Minnesota also violated the full faith and
credit clause.
Reversed.
ONE JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

I agree that the judgment below must be reversed, but I think
its infirmity is more demonstrable under the full faith and credit
clause than under the due process clause. Thus I would prefer to
base our reversal solely on full faith and credit grounds.
The full faith and credit clause is the principal guardian of federal interests in the choice-of-law context.36 In part, it imposes national uniformity when there are important reasons to apply a single
body of law in determining the rights or liabilities of persons related
to a particular transaction or entity. 3 ' But it also serves to correct
serious distortions in the normal choice-of-law process." In this latter respect, it preserves federal values by maintaining some sense of
multistate order in those (fortunately rare) cases where a state appears to be manipulating choice-of-law rules to reach predetermined
results without giving heed to the interests of other states.3 ' This is
to be distinguished, of course, from cases where a state simply errs in
applying its choice-of-law rules. 0
The real significance of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
tional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 42-43
(1981).
36. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 12, at 136-40; Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and ConstitutionalChoice of Law, 10 HoSTrRA L. REv. 149, 162 n.36
(1981). But see Reese, supra note 15, at 1587-91; Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 92100 (1981); Weintraub, supra note 3, at 25-26.
37. See Kirgis, supra note 22, at 120; Sedler, supra note 36, at 92-100; von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 35, at 49, 53-56.
38. See Kirgis, supra note 22, at 120, 122; von Mebren & Trautman, supra note 35, at
49, 51-53.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 41-57.
40. See Hague, 449 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring); cf. Weintraub, supra note 3,
at 25 (distinguishing evaluation of the constitutional issue from evaluation of the Minnesota
decision as a matter of normal conflicts law).
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Co. v. Yates" is not simply that the relationship of the forum state
to the parties and the transaction was attenuated, 42 but that the
Georgia Supreme Court manipulated its normal choice-of-law approach to reach the desired outcome: choice of Georgia law. This it
did by treating as "procedural"-and thus subject to Georgia's permissive rule-the question whether a material misrepresentation in
New York on an application for an insurance policy could be neutralized by a showing that the applicant orally gave the true facts to
the agent.43 Such an unprincipled choice of law subverts interstate
legal order, in violation of the full faith and credit clause.
Although I am reluctant to accuse any state of manipulating its
rules to reach desired outcomes, I must conclude that Minnesota has
done so when it has been presented with choice-of-law issues in personal injury or death cases. Since it decided Milkovich v. Saari" in
1973, the Minnesota Supreme Court has used Professor Robert A.
Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" as its choice-of-law
method. As noted in the majority opinion, these considerations are
(1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of
the better rule of law.45 Professor Leflar has made clear that these
considerations should not result in an automatic preference for forum law, nor should they operate to favor "preferred parties" (as
distinguished from preferred rules of law, under the last consideration). 46 Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court, from the time it adopted
the Leflar approach, has consistently chosen the plaintiff-favoring
law in personal injury and death cases, selecting its own law whenever possible and the other state's law on the rare occasions when
Minnesota law would favor the defendant.
In Milkovich, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied Minnesota
law to permit an Ontario automobile passenger to recover from a
negligent Ontario host when they had an accident on a brief visit to
Minnesota. Minnesota had no guest statute; Ontario did. In its next
choice-of-law case, Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,'7
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

299 U.S. 178 (1936).
Hague, 449 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion).
182 Ga. 213, 214, 185 S.E. 268, 269 (1936).
295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
Leflar, supra note 8, at 282.
Id. at 299, 303; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966).
47. 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
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the Minnesota court applied the Minnesota comparative negligence
rule to benefit a Minnesota plaintiff whose contributory negligence in
an Indiana accident would have barred recovery under Indiana law.
The defendants' only known contact with Minnesota was that they
were licensed to do business there. Then, in Myers v. Government
Employees Insurance Co.,4 8 the Minnesota court found that the forum's governmental interests (Leflar's fourth consideration) would
be advanced by combining Louisiana's direct action statute4 ' with
Minnesota's long statute of limitations5" to give a Minnesota resident, injured in Louisiana, a remedy against the tortfeasor's insurance company. Next, in Blarney v. Brown, 1 the court held that the
Minnesota Dram Shop Act 52 did not impose liability on the owner of
a small Wisconsin bar for an intoxicated patron's negligence in Minnesota on his way home. Minnesota common law, however, came to
the Minnesota plaintiff's rescue despite the bar owner's nonliability
under Wisconsin law. In Follese v. Eastern Airlines,53 a flight attendant hired outside Minnesota and based in Florida was allowed to
obtain Minnesota workers' compensation benefits for injuries incurred outside Minnesota during scheduled flights.5 When injured,
she was a Florida resident, although she may have retained her preexisting Minnesota domicile, to which she returned after she left her
employment. 55 Finally, in Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 56 the Minnesota Supreme Court used Minnesota law to invalidate an intra-family immunity clause in an insurance policy issued in
Florida to a Floridian whose negligence in Minnesota was partly responsible for an injury to his spouse. Other Minnesota decisions with
interstate fact situations have similarly interpreted Minnesota statutes generously for plaintiffs. 57
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 655 (West 1978).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.14 (West 1947) (repealed 1977).
270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1981).
271 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1978).

54. Benefits were denied in connection with one accident that occurred after the Minnesota compensation statute was amended to preclude its application to out-of-state injuries incurred by a worker neither hired nor based in the state. Id. at 832-33.
55. Id. at 830-31.
56. 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
57. See Petty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1980); Ewers v. Thunderbird
Aviation, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1979). See generally Davies, A Legislator's Look at
Hague and Choice of Law, 10 HOFsTRA L. REV. 171 (1981) (pointing out Minnesota's consistent preference for application of its own rules of law).
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Unless one argues that, under Professor Leflar's fifth consideration, the rule favoring the plaintiff is always the better rule of
law-an argument neither Professor Leflar nor the Minnesota Supreme Court makes outright-it is difficult to characterize Minnesota's application of the Leflar approach as anything other than manipulative. It is true that individual examination of the case before
us (or any other individual case in the Milkovich line) does not easily reveal choice-of-law manipulation. But we should not blind ourselves to the larger picture. This Court may legitimately ask whether
the cumulative effect of a state court's decisions over a period of
time would impair federal interests, even though any single decision
would not. That is precisely what was done in another context in
Zschernig v. Miller,8 where the Court struck down an Oregon probate law because the Oregon courts had applied it over the years in
ways that intruded upon the federal government's effective conduct
of the nation's foreign policy. In that case, as in the present dispute,
the occasion was and is appropriate to put an end to state obstruction of federal goals, even though the obstruction in the case at hand,
considered alone, is not major.59
Since I believe Minnesota has violated the full faith and credit
clause, I would not reach the due process issue.
THREE JUSTICES, DISSENTING

For purposes of argument, we accept the proposition that the
due process and full faith and credit clauses provide separate tests
for the constitutionality of state choice of law. We think Minnesota
violated neither clause in this case.
The majority concedes that Minnesota did not defeat Allstate's
expectations.60 That should have ended the due process inquiry.61 Instead, the majority goes on to apply a due process "power" test, and
determines that Minnesota exceeded appropriate limits upon its
power to subject Allstate to its substantive rule of law. There is,
58. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
59. Zschernigstruck down the Oregon statute even though the Justice Department had
disclaimed any undue interference with the conduct of American foreign relations in the circumstances of that particular case. Id. at 434. In Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980),
this Court considered the subtle shift from focus on the defendant to focus on the plaintiff in a
string of quasi in rem jurisdiction cases; we said that "[s]uch an approach is forbidden by
InternationalShoe and its progeny." If we could look at trends in Rush, and not just at the
case then before us, there is no reason to refrain from doing so here.
60. See supra text accompanying note 22.
61. See Martin, supra note 12, at 133-36.
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however,
no assertion that Minnesota lacked the power to hear the
2
case.

6

If the exertion of state power is a due process concern at all, it
should be so only when the issue relates to the exercise of a court's
jurisdiction over a defendant. When a state court attempts to exercise its jurisdiction, it is exerting power over the parties-power that
may be enforced, for example, by use of the contempt process or by
attachment and execution against the parties' property. It is this tangible exertion of power that has concerned this Court in cases like
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsone" and Hanson v.
Denckla.e
Absent a showing of unfair surprise to a party, we have not
heretofore concerned ourselves with the power of a state under the
due process clause to apply its own law in any case lacking an international dimension, once a court has legitimately asserted personal
jurisdiction over the parties. The reason, we submit, is that any necessary limit upon the power of a state to apply its own law, apart
from limits imposed by notions of fairness to individual parties, is
based on the needs of federalism embodied in the full faith and
credit clause. The sole exception, if Home Insurance Co. v. Dicke is
still good law, is in cases where the only "state" involved other than
the forum is a foreign nation. Thus, in the absence of some convincing demonstration of unfairness in this case, there is no due process
reason to strike down Minnesota's application of its own law."
The concurring opinion attempts to identify a federal interest in
avoiding manipulation of choice-of-law rules, and finds this interest
expressed in the full faith and credit clause. 7 The opinion concedes,
however, that manipulation is to be distinguished from simple error
in applying choice-of-law rules."8 We think Minnesota committed a
simple error, at most. e"
62.
63.
64.
65.

See
444
357
281

supra text accompanying note 6.
U.S. 286 (1980).
U.S. 235 (1958).
U.S. 397 (1930).

66. The majority suggests that application of Minnesota law may have been unfair in
this case, but the point is not developed. See supra note 22. We simply note that Allstate could

have foreseen the application of Minnesota law.
67.
68.

See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
See supra text accompanying note 40.

69. Professor Leflar, whose methodology Minnesota employs, has examined the result in
this case and does not accuse the Minnesota court of manipulation. He implies that the choice

of Minnesota law may have been erroneous, but that is not tantamount to saying it was manipulative. If he does not think there was manipulation, we fail to see how our concurring col-
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It is said, however, that this is just one of a series of Minnesota
choice-of-law decisions favoring plaintiffs, and that the cumulative
effect of these decisions amounts to a full faith and credit violation."0
Even if we assume arguendo that it is appropriate to rely on cumulative effect rather than limiting our analysis to the case at hand,7 1 one
must recognize that the choice-of-law method espoused by Minnesota places considerable emphasis on applying "the better rule of
law." The modern trend in personal injury and death cases,
whether or not they involve choice-of-law issues, is to spread rather
than concentrate the risk."8 That implies, of course, that plaintifforiented rules are likely to be regarded as "better;" Minnesota
should not, therefore, be accused of manipulation if it chooses those
rules in multistate personal injury and death cases.
Since there is no other plausible reason to think that Minnesota
violated either the due process or the full faith and credit clause, the
judgment below should be affirmed.
THE WISHFUL THINKER'S CONCLUSION

Persons should not be subjected to the adverse rules of a state
with which they have no contact or affiliation relevant to the particular rules involved. This is the most persuasive reading of the Dick
case, and it should be reaffirmed. The Dick Court employed the due
process clause to reach this result, using the clause not as a matter of
federalism nor even of international comity, but as a means of reining in a political entity (Texas) that had used its power excessively.
Minnesota similarly transgressed in Hague and should have suffered
the same fate. To use the due process clause to reach this result
would strain neither the language nor the purpose of the clause,
since it could hardly be "due process" for a state to dictate to all it
can catch how they should behave.74
league could think otherwise. See Leflar, Choice of Law: States"Rights, 10 HoisrRA L. REV.
203, 204 (1981).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 44-59.
71. We note that Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), upon which the concurring
opinion relies, dealt with the delicate area of state interference with the federal foreign affairs
power, and did not involve the full faith and credit clause.
72. See Leflar, supra note 8, at 295-304; Leflar, supra note 46, at 1587-88.
73. See generally Symposium, ProductsLiability: Economic Analysis and the Law, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970). In the tort area, "substantive rules have shown a continual development in favor of recovery." R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 12, § 6.4, at 271 (footnote omitted).
74. I am sensitive to Professor Redish's criticism of the way the due process clause has
been used in personal jurisdiction cases. See Redish, supra note 16, passim. I agree that it is
not an appropriate tool for requiring states to respect federal interests, but its primary focus on
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The hypothetical concurring opinion, though plausible, is less
convincing than the majority opinion. As the dissent points out, Professor Leflar's methodology virtually cries out for the choice of plaintiff-favoring rules in personal injury and death cases. One might say
that the Leflar approach openly invites manipulation,7 5 but one must
ask whether that manipulation offends federal interests if it does not
inevitably result in choice of forum law over all other states' law. In
Minnesota there is a strong forum preference,7 6 but an even stronger
plaintiff preference. The latter, in itself, probably should not be a
full faith and credit concern.
The trouble with the dissent is that it takes too narrow a view of
the due process clause. We do need some check on the states'
rulemaking power even when other states' interests are not seriously
impaired, 7 and the due process clause provides the appropriate
means. Minnesota, and its sister states, should be given that
message.

the interests of persons does make this clause an appropriate tool for restraining states' attempts to dictate rules of law for persons to obey.
75. Cf. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflectionson Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327, 342 (1982) (Leflar methodology can be
manipulated to produce the same results as interest analysis).
76. See Davies, supra note 57, at 171-82.
77. See supra notes 47-57, and accompanying text.
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